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COLOR IMAGERY 2	  
Abstract 27	  
Mental color imagery abilities are commonly measured using paradigms that involve naming, 28	  
judging or comparing the colors of visual mental images of well-known objects (e.g., “is a 29	  
sunflower darker yellow than a lemon”?). Although this approach is widely used in patient 30	  
studies, differences in the ability to perform such color comparisons might simply reflect 31	  
participants’ general knowledge of object colors rather than their ability to generate accurate 32	  
visual mental images of the colors of the objects. The aim of the present study was to design a 33	  
new color imagery paradigm. Participants were asked to visualize a color for 3 s and then to 34	  
determine a visually presented color by pressing one of six keys. We reasoned that 35	  
participants would react faster when the imagined and perceived colors were congruent than 36	  
when they were incongruent. In Experiment 1, participants were slower in incongruent than 37	  
congruent trials but only when they were instructed to visualize the colors. The results in 38	  
Experiment 2 demonstrate that the congruency effect reported in Experiment 1 cannot be 39	  
attributed to verbalization of the color that had to be visualized. Finally, in Experiment 3, the 40	  
congruency effect evoked by mental imagery correlated with performance in a perceptual 41	  
version of the task. We discuss these findings with respect to the mechanisms that underlie 42	  
mental imagery and patients suffering from color imagery deficits.  43	  
Keywords: mental imagery, color imagery, chromatic imagery  44	  
  45	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Introduction 46	  
Imagine your mind’s eye to be greyscale. How would you find out whether some 47	  
pillows in a shop match the color of the couch in your living room? How would you know 48	  
that you would like the dress of your friend better if only it had a different color? Mental 49	  
imagery of color is part of real life cognitive activity. However, as De Vreese (1991) pointed 50	  
out, due to methodological obstacles, color imagery has hitherto not received much attention 51	  
especially in healthy participants.  52	  
To date, most studies have focused on impairments of color imagery following brain 53	  
lesions. Color imagery was measured in tasks requiring patients to name or select colors of 54	  
common objects (Bartolomeo, Bachoud-Levi, & Denes, 1997; Chatterjee & Southwood, 55	  
1995; De Vreese, 1991; Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Manning, 2000; Shuren, Brott, Schefft, & 56	  
Houston, 1996), to decide whether a specific color is appropriate for a common object 57	  
(Goldenberg, Müllbacher, & Nowak, 1995; Zago, Corti, Bersano, Baron, Conti, Ballabio, et 58	  
al., 2010), to mentally compare the hues of different objects (Bartolomeo, et al., 1997; 59	  
Chatterjee & Southwood, 1995; De Vreese, 1991; Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Shuren, et al., 60	  
1996; Zago, et al., 2010), to name as many objects of a particular color (Bartolomeo, et al., 61	  
1997; De Vreese, 1991) or to produce as many color names as possible (Bartolomeo, et al., 62	  
1997). The findings from these studies converge in showing a double dissociation between 63	  
color perception and color imagery: some patients have impaired color imagery but intact 64	  
color perception (Bartolomeo, et al., 1997; Chatterjee & Southwood, 1995; Goldenberg, et al., 65	  
1995; Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Shuren, et al., 1996; Zago, et al., 2010) while others have 66	  
impaired color perception but intact color imagery (De Vreese, 1991; Goldenberg, 1992; 67	  
Manning, 2000).  68	  
This double dissociation between color imagery and color perception is rather 69	  
surprising given the huge overlap in brain activation that was found in mental imagery and 70	  
perception of objects (e.g., O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000, 71	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Ishai, Haxby, & Ungerleider, 2002, Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim, & Alpert, 1995; Slotnick, 72	  
Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2005; for a review see Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). Indeed, the 73	  
results of neuroimaging studies with healthy participants on the degree of overlap of the brain 74	  
areas activated in color perception and color imagery remain largely inconclusive. Some 75	  
studies reported that object color retrieval elicits activation in the same areas as the ones 76	  
activated in color perception, notably in color selective visual areas such as V4 (Hsu, 77	  
Frankland, & Thompson-Schill, 2012; Hsu, Kraemer, Oliver, Schlichting, & Thompson-78	  
Schill, 2011; Rich, Williams, Puce, Syngeniotis, Howard, McGlone, et al., 2006; Simmons, 79	  
Ramjee, Beauchamp, McRae, Martin, & Barsalou, 2007). Conversely, other neuroimaging 80	  
studies did not report a functional overlap between color imagery and perception (Bramao, 81	  
Faisca, Forkstam, Reis, & Petersson, 2010; Chao & Martin, 1999; Howard, Ffytche, Barnes, 82	  
McKeefry, Ha, Woodruff, et al., 1998; Lu, Xu, Jin, Mo, Zhang, & Zhang, 2010; Miceli, 83	  
Fouch, Capasso, Shelton, Tomaiuolo, & Caramazza, 2001).  84	  
A possible reason for the discrepancy in the literature might be the varying extent to 85	  
which the tasks used to measure the ability to visualize color did actually involve color 86	  
imagery. First, answering a question such as “what color is a lime?” might not rely 87	  
exclusively on the ability to generate an accurate visual mental image of a lime in color but 88	  
also on semantic knowledge about this object (i.e., color knowledge). Moreover, some color 89	  
terms are tightly linked to colors in a linguistic fashion (e.g., we refer to bright lucent green as 90	  
“lime green”). Some researchers have argued that both visual and/or verbal processes 91	  
contribute to color knowledge (Beauvois & Saillant, 1985) and that these processes might be 92	  
hard to distinguish in tasks in which participants need to determine the typical color of an 93	  
object (De Vreese, 1991). Second, mental hue comparison tasks such as “is a strawberry 94	  
darker red than a tomato?” can be solved with greyscale imagery. Third, the tasks designed to 95	  
date do not necessarily tap into pure color imagery but also involve the visualization of shape 96	  
and other attributes of the objects (Chang, Lewis, & Pearson, 2013). Last but not least, most 97	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of these tasks are easy to solve, especially for participants with no color knowledge 98	  
impairments. Thus, the available tasks may not be subtle enough to assess individual color 99	  
imagery abilities of healthy participants.   100	  
Recently, Chang et al. (2013) developed the first paradigm to measure pure color 101	  
imagery in the absence of object imagery. Participants were instructed to imagine a cued 102	  
color, just thereafter two colors were presented binocularly and participants judged which of 103	  
the two colors they perceived. Participants more often indicated to perceive the color that they 104	  
just imagined. It is unclear, however, whether this effect reflects an influence of color 105	  
imagery on perception due to shared mechanisms or whether the same results could have been 106	  
obtained by simply verbally repeating the color rather than visualizing the color before the 107	  
binocular rivalry display was presented. 108	  
The present study aimed at developing a refined pure color imagery paradigm. The 109	  
principle of this paradigm relies on the classical finding that visual mental imagery modulates 110	  
subsequent perception of visual stimuli (Chang, et al., 2013; Ishai & Sagi, 1995; Pearson, 111	  
Rademaker, & Tong, 2008; Perky, 1910). Participants were first instructed to visualize a color 112	  
in a blank box indicated either by the presentation of a greyscale picture of an object (i.e., 113	  
lemon) or by the two first letters of the color to visualize. After the visualization period, a 114	  
color was displayed in that box. Participants were instructed to determine the visually 115	  
presented colors as fast and accurately as possible by pressing one of six keys. We expected 116	  
shorter reaction times on trials where the visualized color matched the presented color (i.e., 117	  
congruent trials) when compared to trials where the visualized color did not match the 118	  
presented color (i.e., incongruent trials). In Experiment 1, we asked two groups of participants 119	  
to perform this task. One group was instructed to visualize the colors in response to the two 120	  
cue types (i.e., objects or first two letters of the color name). The other group received no 121	  
instruction to generate mental images of colors (control group). If color mental imagery 122	  
modulates reaction times in a subsequent color identification task then participants in the 123	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mental imagery group but not in the control group should be faster to identify the color in 124	  
congruent trials than in incongruent trials. Experiment 2 was conducted in order to exclude 125	  
the possibility that the congruency effect reported in Experiment 1 (i.e., shorter response 126	  
times for congruent compared to incongruent trials) could be due to verbal priming. Finally, 127	  
in Experiment 3, we investigated whether individual differences in the congruency effects in 128	  
the mental imagery task were related to the congruency effects in a perceptual version of this 129	  
task (i.e., a color was displayed visually preceding the visual presentation of the color to 130	  
identify). We reasoned that if color imagery functionally overlaps with color perception, the 131	  
congruency effects in these two versions of the tasks should be correlated.  132	  
Experiment 1 133	  
Methods 134	  
Participants. Thirty-two participants (28 females) ranging in age between 19 and 47 135	  
years (M = 24.75, SD = 6.525) were recruited from the Department of Psychology at the 136	  
University of Bern and received course credits for their participation. They were informed 137	  
that the study was about color imagery and color perception. All participants confirmed not to 138	  
be color-blind. They all gave written informed consent to participate prior to the experiment 139	  
and were treated in accordance with the ethical protocol approved by the Faculty of Human 140	  
Sciences of the University of Bern and the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 141	  
Conduct” of the American Psychological Association (2002).  142	  
Material. We designed two imagery cue types (letters, objects). In the letter condition, 143	  
we used the first two letters of the colors (e.g., “gr” for green) in 18 pt black Courier font on a 144	  
white background. Since a color word might automatically activate color concepts (as in the 145	  
classical Stroop task, Stroop, 1935), we presented only the first two letters of the cue word. 146	  
Because two color words used in the experiment start with the same letter in German (the 147	  
language in which the experiment was conducted), we presented not only the first but the first 148	  
two letters of the color words. The background was white (min luminance = 38.2 cd/m2, max 149	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luminance = 41.4 cd/m2, mean1 = 255) throughout the experiment. In the object condition, six 150	  
standardized black and white objects from the bank of standardized stimuli (BOSS; Brodeur, 151	  
Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil & Lepage, 2010) were used, which were explicitly related to one of 152	  
the six visually presented colors (lemon (min luminance = 5.41 cd/m2, max luminance = 20.4 153	  
cd/m2, mean = 134.10), orange (min luminance = 3.82 cd/m2, max luminance = 11.38 cd/m2, 154	  
mean = 112.77), tomato (min luminance = 2.3 cd/m2, max luminance = 10.4 cd/m2, mean = 155	  
72.93), eggplant (min luminance = 0.55 cd/m2, max luminance = 5.69 cd/m2, mean = 40.33), 156	  
lettuce (min luminance = 1.25 cd/m2, max luminance = 16.9, mean = 89.92), walnut (min 157	  
luminance = 2.62 cd/m2, max luminance = 7.40 cd/m2, mean = 88.64)). It is possible that 158	  
black and white object images automatically activate color concepts because they are 159	  
concrete. Thus, we also included letter cues, which are less likely to trigger automatic 160	  
processes and conceptual biases. Using both types of cues allows for comparing possible 161	  
influences of automatic concept activation. Participants visualized one of six colors (yellow, 162	  
orange, red, purple, green, brown) in response to the letters or object cues within a blank 163	  
square. After participants visualized one of the six colors in the blank box, a colored square of 164	  
the same size was presented visually. We chose the following six colors (and corresponding 165	  
RGB and luminance values): yellow (255, 251, 0; min luminance = 33.9 cd/m2, max 166	  
luminance = 36.3 cd/m2, mean = 225), orange (230, 150, 0; min luminance = 20.3 cd/m2, max 167	  
luminance = 21.9 cd/m2, mean = 158), red (255, 37, 0; min luminance = 10.8 cd/m2, max 168	  
luminance = 11.6 cd/m2, mean = 98), purple (70, 30, 90; min luminance = 1.46 cd/m2, max 169	  
luminance = 1.59 cd/m2, mean = 49), green (1, 128, 0; min luminance = 9.07 cd/m2, max 170	  
luminance = 9.54 cd/m2, mean = 76) and brown (139, 69, 19; min luminance = 5.23 cd/m2, 171	  
max luminance = 5.47 cd/m2, mean = 84). The viewing angle of the greyscale pictures of 172	  
objects, the blank square and the colored squares was approximately 10.7°.  173	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mean was derived from luminance histogram in Adobe Photoshop CS6.	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Procedure. Participants were tested in pairs in separate cubicles so that they did not 174	  
see each other’s computer screen. Data was collected using E-Prime v1.2 (Psychology 175	  
Software Tools INC., Pittsburgh, USA; www.pstnet.com/prime). Participants performed two 176	  
blocks of trials, one with letters and one with greyscale pictures of objects as cues. The order 177	  
of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of 100 trials 178	  
without break. There was a short, non-paced break between the two blocks (approximately 3 179	  
minutes). 180	  
Each trial started with a fixation cross, followed by a cue (first two letters of a color 181	  
word or a greyscale picture of an object) and an inter stimulus interval of 500 ms each. Then a 182	  
blank square was presented for 3000 ms. Both groups were briefed that the letter cues 183	  
corresponded to the first two letters of a color word. However, only the imagery group was 184	  
instructed to mentally visualize the cued color during presentation of the blank box whereas 185	  
the control group was just instructed to wait until the color target appears. Finally, a colored 186	  
square replaced the blank square and participants were asked to determine the color of the 187	  
square presented by pressing one of six keys as quickly and accurately as possible. The 188	  
procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. To facilitate key-response mapping, the six keys were 189	  
laminated with colored paper that was visible even when the fingers were placed on the 190	  
respective keys (“x” = yellow, “c” = orange, “v” = red, “b” = purple, “n” = green, “m” = 191	  
brown). This assignment was the same for all participants in all experiments. Participants 192	  
used their left ring, middle and index finger for the yellow, orange and red keys and their right 193	  
index, middle and ring finger for the purple, green and brown keys. There was no feedback 194	  
throughout the experiment. 195	  
Importantly, congruent trials were defined as trials in which the cued color and the 196	  
color presented visually matched (e.g., tomato-red). In incongruent trials, the cued and 197	  
displayed color did not match (e.g., lemon-purple). In each block, the same amount of 198	  
congruent and incongruent trials (50 trials each) appeared in randomized order. Participants 199	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were randomly assigned to either the mental imagery or the control group and to one of two 200	  
task sequence conditions (object cues first, letter cues first). Reaction times (i.e., time 201	  
between the onset of the color square and the button-press) and accuracy were recorded. In 202	  
order to compare the results of our color imagery task with standard measures of general 203	  
visual imagery vividness and to control for group differences in standard imagery tests, all 204	  
participants completed a computer-based version of the vividness of visual imagery 205	  
questionnaire (VVIQ; Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague & Eagleman, 2007; Marks, 1973) after the 206	  
color identification task.  207	  
Results 208	  
Given that no practice block was performed, we excluded the first 10 trials of each 209	  
task. For the reaction time analysis, we only included values of correctly solved trials and we 210	  
discarded values that deviated more than three standard deviations from each participant’s 211	  
mean (1.08% of the remaining trials). Errors occurred in less than 6% of the trials and did not 212	  
differ as a function of condition. We computed a mixed-design analysis of variance 213	  
(ANOVA) with the within-participant factors cue type (i.e., letters vs. objects trials) and 214	  
congruency (i.e., congruent vs. incongruent trials) and the between-participant factor group 215	  
(mental imagery vs. control). 216	  
 The descriptive data of the reaction times can be found in Table 1 and are depicted in 217	  
Figure 2. Whereas neither the cue type, F<1, nor the group, F(1, 30) = 1.87, p = .18, had an 218	  
effect on reaction times, there was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 30) = 25.04, p 219	  
< .001, ηp2 = .46). Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons confirmed that participants 220	  
were generally faster on congruent compared to incongruent trials (p < .001). As expected, the 221	  
effect of the congruency varied in the two groups as revealed by a significant congruency 222	  
group interaction, F(1, 30) = 9.02, p < .005, ηp2 = .23. Paired samples t-tests revealed that the 223	  
experimental group was significantly faster on congruent compared to incongruent trials 224	  
(t(15) = -4.94, p < .001, d = 1.24) whereas the control group did not show such an effect 225	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(t(15) = -1.71, p = .108). No other two- or three-way interactions reached significance (all ps 226	  
> .18). A similar three-way mixed-design ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed no 227	  
significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .062, see Table 2 for mean accuracy) 228	  
suggesting that the reaction times cannot be explained by a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 229	  
One could speculate that the congruency effect in the object cue trials reflects 230	  
luminance congruency between cues and targets rather than effects of color imagery. If this 231	  
were the case, the same congruency effect would emerge even when participants simply 232	  
visualize the black and white object cue. To test this hypothesis, we correlated mean 233	  
luminance differences between object cues and color targets and reaction times on a trial-by-234	  
trial basis. Indeed, there was a significant correlation in the imagery group (r(1369) = .086, p 235	  
= .001), however, this relationship was absent in the control group (r(1383) = .021, p = .438). 236	  
 In order to test the reliability of this task, a bivariate Pearson correlation was 237	  
calculated between the congruency effects (reaction times of incongruent – congruent trials) 238	  
of the first and second half of the task in the experimental group. The results revealed a high 239	  
reliability (r(14) = .94, p < .001). The mean VVIQ score was M = 2.195, SD = .483 in the 240	  
experimental group and M = 2.395, SD = .606 in the control group. This difference was not 241	  
significant (t(30) = -1.028, p = .751). Finally, we computed bivariate Pearson correlations 242	  
between the individual congruency effects (reaction times on incongruent – reaction times on 243	  
congruent trials, across cue type conditions) and the VVIQ scores in the experimental group. 244	  
These results revealed no significant correlation, r(14) = .11, p = .69).  245	  
Discussion 246	  
Consistent with our hypotheses, we showed that visualizing colors influences 247	  
subsequent color identification reaction times. The reaction time difference between 248	  
congruent and incongruent trials was larger in the group that was instructed to mentally 249	  
visualize colors than in the control group. Moreover, the reliability of the color imagery task 250	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was high, as indicated by the correlation between the congruency effects in the first and 251	  
second half of the task.  252	  
 It could be argued that the mental imagery task we designed did not necessarily 253	  
require participants to visualize colors – that is to generate depictive representations of the 254	  
colors (Kosslyn, 2005). Possibly, the same response pattern could emerge from inner 255	  
verbalization of the colors. Assuming that participants were silently repeating 256	  
“red...red…red…” after being cued with a tomato, they could have been just as slow when 257	  
having to determine the color of a green patch right afterwards. Pylyshyn's (1973) 258	  
propositional theory suggests that the propositional features of the word “red” would prime 259	  
participants to process the color red faster on congruent trials. We conducted a second 260	  
experiment to determine whether the same congruency effect as the one reported in 261	  
Experiment 1 would replicate in a condition in which verbal priming could not occur.  262	  
Experiment 2 263	  
In Experiment 2, participants were asked to perform the same task as in Experiment 1 264	  
either in the mental imagery condition or the control condition (i.e., with no imagery 265	  
instruction) while performing a concurrent articulatory suppression task (i.e., repeating ‘ba’ 266	  
during the presentation of the blank box). The concurrent articulatory suppression task 267	  
prevented phonological encoding of the colors (a similar procedure has been used by 268	  
Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 1992, in the context of a short-term memory task). We 269	  
reasoned that if the congruency effect found in Experiment 1 was due to visualization of the 270	  
color rather than due to inner verbalization of the color name, then the congruency effect 271	  
should be found even when participants performed an articulatory suppression task while they 272	  
were imagining the color.     273	  
Methods 274	  
Participants. Thirty-two participants (18 female) ranging in age between 19 and 52 275	  
years (M = 25.38, SD = 8.4) were recruited from the Department of Psychology of the 276	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University of Bern. There was no compensation for participation in the study. Participants 277	  
were randomly assigned to either the mental imagery or the control group. All participants 278	  
confirmed not to be color-blind. They all gave written informed consent to participate prior to 279	  
the experiment and were treated in accordance with the ethical protocol approved by the 280	  
Faculty of Human Sciences of the University of Bern and the “Ethical Principles of 281	  
Psychologists and Code of Conduct” of the American Psychological Association (2002). 282	  
Material. The material was identical to the one used in Experiment 1.  283	  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to the one in Experiment 1, except that 284	  
participants in both groups were given the instruction to repeat the syllables ‘ba...ba...ba...’ 285	  
out loud during the presentation of the blank box. In contrast to Experiment 1, participants 286	  
were tested individually. 287	  
Results 288	  
As in Experiment 1, we excluded the first 10 trials of each task. Of all correctly solved 289	  
trials, we then excluded responses that deviated more than three standard deviations from 290	  
each participant’s mean (1.09% of the remaining trials). Errors occurred in less than 9% of the 291	  
trials and did not differ as a function of condition. One participant was excluded from the data 292	  
analysis because his reaction times were more than 2.5 SD from the mean of the group. As in 293	  
Experiment 1, we analyzed the reaction times by means of a mixed-design ANOVA with the 294	  
within-participant factors cue type (i.e., letters vs. objects trials) and congruency (i.e., 295	  
congruent vs. incongruent trials) and the between-participant factor group (mental imagery vs. 296	  
control). 297	  
 As shown in Figure 3 (see also Table 1), there was no effect of the cue type, F(1, 28) = 298	  
2.456, p = .128, or the group, F < 1. However, there was a main effect of congruency, F(1, 299	  
28) = 65.991, p < .001, ηp2 = .70. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed that 300	  
participants were significantly faster on congruent compared to incongruent trials (p < .001). 301	  
A significant two-way interaction, F(1, 28) = 8.476, p = .007, ηp2 = .23 shows that the 302	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congruency effect was larger in the mental imagery than the control group. There were no 303	  
other significant two-way or three-way interactions (all ps > .305). A similar three-way 304	  
ANOVA on the accuracy rate revealed no main effects or interactions (all ps > 0.78, see 305	  
Table 2), suggesting that no speed-accuracy tradeoff could account for the effect reported on 306	  
the reaction times. 307	  
In order to check influences of object cue luminance on congruency effects, we 308	  
correlated the mean luminance differences between black and white object cues and color 309	  
targets with reaction times on a trial-by-trial basis. Similar to Experiment 1 we found a 310	  
significant correlation in the imagery group (r(1382) = .136, p < .001) but not in the control 311	  
group (r(1275) = .003. p = .914).  312	  
 As in Experiment 1, we calculated the split-half correlation of the congruency effect in 313	  
the experimental group. The results revealed a high reliability (r(14) = .84, p < .001). The 314	  
mean VVIQ score was M = 2.441, SD = .551 in the experimental group and M = 2.321, SD = 315	  
.443 in the control group. This difference was not significant (t(29) = .669, p = .509). Again 316	  
we found no correlation between the individual congruency effect in the mental imagery 317	  
group and the scores on the VVIQ, r(14) = -.21, p = .44) in the experimental group.  318	  
Discussion 319	  
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether visualizing colors would influence reaction 320	  
times in a color identification task while preventing participants to internally repeat the color 321	  
verbally during the mental imagery period. As predicted, the mental imagery group was faster 322	  
on congruent compared to incongruent trials, despite repeating a color-unrelated syllable 323	  
(“ba”) during the color imagery period.  324	  
The replication of the congruency effect reported in Experiment 1 while the 325	  
phonological loop was loaded with semantically task-unrelated information suggests that 326	  
participants used a depictive representation to generate the colors during the imagery period 327	  
Kosslyn (2005). 328	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To demonstrate that color imagery functionally overlaps with color perception, as 329	  
suggested by some of previous studies (Sparing, Mottaghy, Ganis, Thompson, Töpper, 330	  
Kosslyn, et al., 2002; Thompson, Kosslyn, Sukel, & Alpert, 2001; for a review see Kosslyn & 331	  
Thompson, 2003), one needs to provide evidence that the congruency effect found between 332	  
imagery and perception is related to the congruency effect that occurs when color perception 333	  
is cued with visually presented color. Experiment 3 was designed to provide such evidence. 334	  
Experiment 3 335	  
 In Experiment 3, participants were asked to perform two versions of the color task. In 336	  
one version, participants were instructed to form a mental image of the cued color (mental 337	  
imagery task) as in Experiments 1 and 2. In the other version, the cued color was visually 338	  
presented in the square following the cue (perception task). If color imagery relies on a 339	  
representation of the same format as color perception, then the congruency effects in these 340	  
two tasks should be positively correlated.  341	  
Methods 342	  
Participants. Thirty-two participants (16 females) ranging in age between 18 and 27 343	  
years (M = 22.13, SD = 1.9) were recruited. There was no compensation for participation in 344	  
the study. All participants confirmed not to be color-blind. They all gave written informed 345	  
consent to participate prior to the experiment and were treated in accordance with the ethical 346	  
protocol approved by the Faculty of Human Sciences of the University of Bern and the 347	  
“Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct” of the American Psychological 348	  
Association (2002). 349	  
Material. The material was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 350	  
Procedure. Experiment 3 consisted of two tasks, an imagery task and a perception 351	  
task. Task type was varied as a within-participant factor in counterbalanced order. The first 352	  
half of the sample was assigned to the letter cue group, the second half to the object cue 353	  
group. The imagery task was exactly the same as in Experiment 1 (mental imagery group). 354	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The same material was used to create a perceptual color task, however with two changes. 355	  
Unlike in the imagery task, the box was colored in the cued color in the perceptual task. After 356	  
fixating for 500 ms and being cued for 500 ms, participants were presented with the cued 357	  
color for 3000 ms. Then, a 200 ms blank was inserted before participants saw the target color 358	  
until they gave a response. Since there were no effects of cue in Experiments 1 and 2, cue 359	  
type was varied as a between-participant factor in Experiment 3 to shorten the procedure. 360	  
Results 361	  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we excluded the first 10 trials of each task. Of all correct 362	  
trials, we then excluded reaction times that deviated more than three standard deviations from 363	  
each subject’s mean (1.22% of the remaining trials). Errors occurred in less than 2% of the 364	  
trials and did not differ as a function of condition. One participant was excluded from the data 365	  
analysis because her reaction times deviated more than 2.5 SD from the mean of the group. 366	  
Reaction times were analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with the within-participant 367	  
factors task type (mental imagery vs. perception), congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and 368	  
the between-participant factor cue type (object vs. letters).  369	  
As shown in Figure 4 (see also Table 1), there was a significant effect of task type, 370	  
F(1, 29) = 11.55, p = .002, ηp2 = .29. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed 371	  
that participants were generally faster in the perception compared to the imagery task (p = 372	  
.002). Also, there was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 29) = 98.94, p < .001, η373	  
p
2= .77. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons confirmed that participants were faster on 374	  
congruent trials compared to incongruent trials (p < .001). As in the previous experiments, 375	  
there was no effect of cue type, F < 1. None of the interactions reached significance (all ps > 376	  
.35). The descriptive values of the accuracy data can be found in Table 2. The same mixed-377	  
design ANOVA on the accuracy did not reveal any main effects or interactions (all ps > .14). 378	  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we calculated the split-half reliability of the congruency effect. 379	  
The results revealed a high correlation (r(29) = .86, p < .001).  380	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As in Experiments 1 and 2, we correlated mean luminance differences between black 381	  
and white object cues and color targets with reaction times on a trial-by-trial basis. These 382	  
correlations were significant both in the imagery task (r(1420) = .120, p < .001) and in the 383	  
perceptual task (r(1422) = .103. p < .001). 384	  
Correlational analyses revealed that the congruency effects in the mental imagery task 385	  
correlated with the congruency effects in the perceptual task, r(29) = .46, p = .01 (see Figure 386	  
5). It could be argued that the relationship between the congruency effects in the mental 387	  
imagery and perceptual task might be due to mean differences in overall reaction time. That 388	  
is, the correlation could be explained by participants’ individual response speed. We 389	  
calculated a partial correlation between the congruency effects in the mental imagery task and 390	  
in the perceptual task while controlling for individual differences in overall reaction time (i.e., 391	  
mean reaction time across tasks and conditions). The partial correlation was significant, 392	  
pr(28) = .39, p = .03. The mean VVIQ score was M = 1.701, SD = .384. As in the previous 393	  
experiments, we found no relation between the congruency effects in the mental imagery task 394	  
and the VVIQ scores, r(29)= -.27, p = .15. 395	  
Discussion 396	  
Experiment 3 provides direct evidence for a relationship between the congruency 397	  
effects evoked by mental imagery and visual perception. Participants were faster on congruent 398	  
compared to incongruent trials. This congruency effect was related to the reaction time 399	  
difference in a perceptual version of the task. Reaction times were generally faster in the 400	  
perceptual task compared to the imagery task. Most probably, this effect emerged due to the 401	  
higher cognitive load in the imagery task. Together, these results suggest that color imagery 402	  
functionally overlaps with color perception and are in line with previous findings 403	  
demonstrating a modulatory influence of color imagery on subsequent perception (Chang et 404	  
al., 2013).  405	  
General Discussion 406	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The goal of this study was to develop and validate an objective color imagery task 407	  
while at the same time minimizing the influence of prior knowledge. Experiment 1 showed 408	  
that the instruction to imagine colors influences reaction times in a subsequent color 409	  
identification task. The reaction time difference between congruent and incongruent trials was 410	  
larger in the group that was instructed to mentally visualize colors compared to the control 411	  
group. In Experiment 2 we showed that this effect cannot be explained by verbal mechanisms. 412	  
Participants who were instructed to imagine the colors showed a larger reaction time 413	  
difference between congruent and incongruent trials than the control group, despite 414	  
simultaneously performing an articulatory suppression task. Experiment 3 demonstrated that 415	  
the congruency effect through mental color imagery is related to a perceptual congruency 416	  
effect on an individual level. We found a congruency effect in all three independent samples 417	  
and moreover, the reliability of the color imagery task was high in all experiments. 418	  
Congruency-incongruency effects have been found frequently in cognitive science. Most 419	  
notably, Stroop (1935) used color congruency in order to study attentional processes. While 420	  
congruency-incongruency effects have already been used to investigate other forms of 421	  
imagery such as motor imagery (e.g., Garbarini et al., 2014) or musical imagery (e.g., Yumoto 422	  
et al., 2005), their application in color imagery research is novel. The findings of our three 423	  
experiments suggest that this novel paradigm is apt to investigate color imagery abilities. In 424	  
the following, we discuss implications of these results with regard to the format of 425	  
representation that underlies mental imagery of colors, individual differences in color imagery 426	  
abilities and implications for patients with a double dissociation between color imagery and 427	  
color perception. 428	  
Our results speak for a pictorial representation format of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 429	  
2005). In Experiment 2, participants who were instructed to imagine the colors showed a 430	  
larger reaction time difference between congruent and incongruent trials than the control 431	  
group, despite performing an articulatory suppression task at the same time. This effect would 432	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not be expected if mental images were represented in a propositional format that functionally 433	  
overlaps with linguistic processing. Moreover, in Experiment 3, the congruency effect evoked 434	  
by mental color imagery was positively correlated with a perceptual congruency effect, even 435	  
after correcting for the individual reaction time level.  436	  
Several studies have demonstrated that perception and imagery share common neural 437	  
mechanisms. For example, the early visual cortex is involved in visual mental imagery (e.g., 438	  
Kosslyn et al., 1995; Slotnick et al., 2005; for a review see Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). 439	  
Given that color imagery and color perception are functionally related (Experiment 3), it is 440	  
likely that both rely on similar neuronal mechanisms, such as information processing in the 441	  
color selective area V4. In fact, there is evidence that object color retrieval in a mental hue 442	  
comparison task activates area V4 (Rich et al., 2006, but see Howard et al., 1998). Further 443	  
evidence for shared neural mechanisms of imagery and perception is provided by Borst and 444	  
Kosslyn (2008) who demonstrated that image scanning in spatial imagery structurally 445	  
overlaps with perceptual image scanning. In a task requiring participants to decide whether an 446	  
arrow points to one exemplar in a pattern of dots, participants’ reaction times increased as the 447	  
distance between the arrow and the target dot increased. Moreover, reaction times increased 448	  
to the same degree when the dot pattern and the arrow were simultaneously presented or when 449	  
the arrow was presented and the dot pattern had to be mentally visualized. Critically, the 450	  
mental image scanning efficiency was related to the visual scanning efficiency suggesting a 451	  
functional and structural overlap between mental imagery and visual perception. Consistent 452	  
with these findings, reaction times in our experiment increased or decreased depending on 453	  
congruency, no matter whether the colors were mentally visualized or perceptually present. 454	  
Moreover, the congruency effects in the color imagery and the color perception task were 455	  
correlated. Thus, the congruency effects in color imagery and color perception suggest that 456	  
color imagery and color perception are functionally equivalent – that is, they share to some 457	  
extent the same cognitive processes. Since we did not have a spatial dimension in our pure 458	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color stimuli, participants were not required to inspect their mental images (cf. Borst & 459	  
Kosslyn, 2008). Nevertheless, generating a mental image of color and maintaining it until 460	  
target onset (approximately 3s) was necessary for a congruency effect. Our paradigm does not 461	  
allow distinguishing these two processes. 462	  
Color is defined by three dimensions: hue, luminance and saturation. Our results do 463	  
not allow for separating color imagery along these dimensions. However, recently it has been 464	  
demonstrated that participants are sensitive to luminance while mentally visualizing scenes as 465	  
evidenced by pupillometry (Laeng & Sulutvedt, 2013). Thus, luminance might also have 466	  
influenced our color imagery task. Indeed we found a relationship between object cue-target 467	  
luminance differences and congruency effects in the imagery tasks in all three experiments as 468	  
well as in the perceptual task in Experiment 3, while the control groups failed to show such 469	  
effects. Crucially, cue luminance could not have influenced congruency effects in letter cue 470	  
trials and the congruency effect did not depend on cue type. So, while luminance differences 471	  
might influence mental color imagery to a certain extent, they are not mainly responsible for 472	  
the effects found in the present study. In future studies it might be interesting to investigate 473	  
whether luminance variations of the same hue produce different congruency effects.  474	  
If color imagery abilities are very fine tuned, one would expect larger congruency 475	  
effects for trials in which the cue and target are more distant (e.g., “lemon” as cue when the 476	  
target is bright yellow compared to “mustard” as cue). From the present study we are unable 477	  
to determine whether and how individual differences in terms of what color is visualized 478	  
when instructed to visualize, for example, “red” or “the color of a tomato”, influenced the 479	  
congruency effects in our study. Thus, a systematic investigation of possible “distance 480	  
effects” might shed light on this limitation. 481	  
Surprisingly, a small congruency effect even emerged when participants were not 482	  
instructed to mentally visualize colors (control group, especially in Experiment 2). Most 483	  
probably, semantic priming might account for these small effects. Alternatively, statistical 484	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learning might have played a role. In fact, although there was the same amount of congruent 485	  
and incongruent trials, the probability of receiving a green target after a yellow-cue, for 486	  
example, was smaller than for receiving a yellow target after the same cue. Nevertheless, this 487	  
does not take away from our finding that the instruction to mentally visualize colors 488	  
consistently resulted in a stronger congruency effect compared to the control groups. 489	  
A disadvantage of previous color imagery tasks used in clinical settings is that they 490	  
can hardly account for individual differences. Consider a patient who fails to indicate whether 491	  
the inside of a banana is brighter yellow than mustard or cannot judge whether it is true or 492	  
false that carrots are purple. Color imagery deficits are not the only explanation that can 493	  
account for failure in such tasks. Rather, the patient might fail to remember what the object 494	  
actually is, the name of the color of the object, what color the object typically has and so on. 495	  
Moreover, participants with the same accuracy in this task would misleadingly be categorized 496	  
as having equal mental color imagery abilities. However, this does not mean that both 497	  
participants imagined the colors with the same vividness.  498	  
Individual differences in mental imagery abilities are commonly assessed by using the 499	  
VVIQ. Although this questionnaire has a remarkable reliability (McKelvie, 1995), the scores 500	  
often fail to correlate with performance in experimental tasks. Indeed, it has been 501	  
demonstrated that the VVIQ is not related to trial-by-trial ratings of vividness in imagery 502	  
tasks (D’Angiulli, Runge, Faulkner, Zakizadeh, Chan, & Morcos, 2013; Laeng & Teodorescu, 503	  
2002; but see Pearson et al., 2011). One reason might be that the VVIQ taps into a set of 504	  
mental imagery abilities, for example imagery of color, spatial position, shape, movement, 505	  
odors and so on, whereas experimental imagery tasks capture isolated imagery components. 506	  
Moreover, there could be individual variance between these imagery components. As such, 507	  
one would expect a relationship between experimental and subjective measures of the same 508	  
imagery component (e.g., color imagery), but no relationship between an experimental color 509	  
imagery task and the set of different questions assessed by means of the VVIQ. Similarly, it 510	  
COLOR IMAGERY 21	  
has been demonstrated that an objective spatial imagery task is related to subjective measures 511	  
of spatial imagery but not to the VVIQ and subjective measures of other imagery components 512	  
such as objects (Borst & Kosslyn, 2010). Furthermore, previous studies report no or only 513	  
weak relations between the VVIQ and spatial tasks (Danaher & Thoresen, 1972; Di Vesta, 514	  
Ingersoll & Sunshine, 1971; Durndell & Wetherick, 1976a, 1976b; Ernest, 1977; Kosslyn, 515	  
Brunn, Cave, & Wallach, 1984; Lorenz & Neisser, 1985; Paivio, 1971; Poltrock & Agnoli, 516	  
1986; Rehm, 1973; Richardson, 1977; Sheehan & Neisser, 1969). One could argue that our 517	  
results are inconsistent with previous findings demonstrating a negative relationship between 518	  
imagery vividness assessed by the VVIQ and color memory (Heuer, Fischman & Reisberg, 519	  
1986; Reisberg, Culver, Heuer & Fischman, 1986). However, several recent studies outside 520	  
the color domain provide evidence for an overlap between short-term memory and mental 521	  
imagery (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Borst, Niven, & Logie, 2012; Borst, Ganis, Thompson, & 522	  
Kosslyn, 2012, Keogh & Pearson, 2011). It has to be considered that our task is neither a 523	  
short-term nor a long-term memory task. Rather, it assesses the ability to imagine colors. 524	  
Specifically, we argue that the congruency effects in our task emerged from interference 525	  
between a mentally visualized and a visually perceived color. 526	  
Our paradigm might be of potential use in a clinical setting, given that the mental 527	  
color imagery task we used in this study is highly reliable. Administering this task in patients 528	  
reporting a color imagery deficit could shed light on the nature of their deficit. Assuming that 529	  
this task reflects mental color imagery processes, patients showing no difference between 530	  
congruent and incongruent trials in the color imagery task while performing well in mental 531	  
hue comparisons are likely to have a true color imagery deficit. In contrast, patients who show 532	  
a congruency effect in the mental color imagery task but who perform poorly on the 533	  
conventional mental hue comparison test would be more likely to have an object-color 534	  
knowledge deficit rather than a color imagery deficit. Thus, our mental color imagery task 535	  
might be a promising tool to differentiate pure color imagery from color knowledge deficits.  536	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A few points need to be taken into account when applying this paradigm to a patient 537	  
population. First, in order to make sure that patients solve the task visually, it is recommended 538	  
to conduct both the imagery and the perceptual task as well as an imagery condition with a 539	  
simultaneous articulatory suppression task. Second, a condition in which patients or 540	  
participants of future studies are not instructed to mentally visualize colors during 541	  
presentation of the blank box might be helpful to control for priming effects (such as the task 542	  
of the control group in the present experiments). Third, when applying this paradigm to a 543	  
patient population one needs to ensure that participants understand the cues. For example, 544	  
using object cues might not lead to the expected results when the patient suffers from an 545	  
object memory deficit. Since cue type did not produce any differences in the congruency 546	  
effects in any of our three experiments, even different cues that are also minimally suggestive 547	  
could be used. Fourth, since the congruency effects in our tasks emerged due to interference 548	  
between a mentally visualized and a visually perceived color, it might be worth to control for 549	  
executive functions. Future studies might also adjust our paradigm in order to investigate 550	  
form, orientation, motion, size, object or spatial imagery both in patients and in healthy 551	  
participants. 552	  
Besides the potential clinical application of our paradigm, another domain in which 553	  
color imagery might be of high interest is synesthesia research. Many forms of synesthesia 554	  
involve sensations of colors when exposed to letters or digits, for example. Additional mental 555	  
experiences such as these accompanying color sensations to graphemes raised the question 556	  
whether synesthetes generally have more vivid imagery. Indeed, there is evidence supporting 557	  
this hypothesis from subjective reports (Barnett & Newell, 2008; Price, 2009). Regarding the 558	  
relationship between color imagery and synesthetic color experiences, Rich et al. (2006) 559	  
found different brain activation for each of the two phenomena. However, considering that 560	  
they used the mental hue comparison task to measure color imagery one might raise the same 561	  
criticism as discussed above. Applying an experimental color imagery task in synesthesia 562	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research could further elucidate the functional and neuronal differences between synesthetes 563	  
and controls in the visualization of colors. 564	  
To conclude, with the present study we suggest a novel, reliable approach to 565	  
investigate visual mental color imagery abilities. We demonstrate that performance in this 566	  
task cannot be attributed to verbal processes, but instead is related to performance in a 567	  
perceptual version of the task. 568	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